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The Current and Future Sales Impact of a Retail Frequency Reward Program  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This research presents an empirical study of the impact of a retail frequency reward program on 
store sales.  We examine both the ―points-pressure,‖ or short-term impact, and the ―rewarded 
behavior,‖ or long-term impact.  The points-pressure impact is due to forward-looking customers 
increasing their purchase levels in order to earn the reward.  The rewarded behavior impact is 
evidenced as purchases above baseline levels after an individual has received a reward and could 
result from either behavioral learning reinforcement or positive affect resulting from the reward.  
We investigate a turkey reward program that awarded free turkeys to shoppers who accumulated 
the required sales levels during an 8-week period.  We find both a points pressure and rewarded 
behavior impact.  These effects are statistically significant and managerially relevant in that the 
program is apparently profitable.  The points pressure impact is especially strong among 
customers who do not place value on frequent shopper programs that in general deliver 
immediate price discounts.  The key implications are that frequency reward programs of the 
form, ―buy x, then receive xx‖ can be profitable, are segmentation strategies, and can 
complement a store’s overall frequent shopper program. 
   
The Current and Future Sales Impact of a Retail Frequency Reward Program 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Frequency reward programs have become significant marketing activities for many 
companies.  Airlines reward travelers with free flights after they have accumulated a required 
level of travel miles.  Hotels reward their customers with free rooms after they’ve stayed at the 
hotel a certain number of nights.  Bookstores award free merchandise to customers who have 
purchased a requisite number of books.  The common thread is that frequency reward programs 
provide a tangible benefit to customers for repeatedly purchasing the company’s product(s). 
  The benefits and costs of reward programs are debated in the literature.  On the plus side, 
reward programs are seen as powerful mechanisms for increasing sales or brand loyalty (Kopalle 
and Neslin 2003).  On the negative side, reward programs can be costly, complex, and precipitate 
significant competitive response (Dowling and Uncles 1997; Kopalle and Neslin 2003). 
  Fundamental to sorting through these trade-offs is the question, ―What is the sales impact 
of frequency reward programs?‖  While there is a rich theoretical literature on the economics of 
these programs (driven by the sales impact) (Kim, Shi, and Srinivasan 2001; Beggs and 
Klemperer 1992; Kopalle and Neslin 2003), there is less empirical study of the sales impact itself 
(Lewis 2004; Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 2000; Bell and Lal 2002; Drèze and Hoch 1998). 
  What makes the sales impact question particularly intriguing is that reward programs can 
increase sales through two mechanisms:  ―points pressure‖ and ―rewarded behavior.‖  The points 
pressure mechanism is the short-term impact, whereby customers increase their purchase rate in 
an effort to earn a reward.  The rewarded behavior mechanism is the long-term impact, whereby 
customers increase their purchase rate after they’ve received the reward.  If reward programs   2 
have a points pressure impact but no reward behavior impact, they function essentially as multi-
period, but still episodic, promotions (Kopalle and Neslin 2003).  If however, there also is a 
rewarded behavior effect, frequency reward programs can be a strategic tool for building the 
brand.  It is therefore important to understand the relative contributions of these mechanisms to 
the overall sales impact of a particular reward program. 
  The purpose of this paper is to measure the short-term (points pressure) and long-term 
(rewarded behavior) effects of a frequency reward program.  The setting is a ―Turkey Reward 
Program‖ implemented by a supermarket chain.  We investigate two executions of the program 
over a two-year period.  Indeed, we find evidence for both points pressure and rewarded 
behavior impacts, and evidence that these impacts are related to customer characteristics. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  First we elaborate on our framework and 
discuss previous research.  Second we describe our method, including the research setting, the 
design of the turkey reward program, and data collection.  Third we describe our analysis and 
results.  We conclude with a discussion of implications for both researchers and practitioners. 
 
FRAMEWORK 
  Figure 1 depicts the points pressure and rewarded behavior impacts.  Period A is the 
customer’s baseline purchase rate.  In Period B, the customer might increase his or her purchase 
rate in order to meet the requirements for a reward.  The customer then might receive a reward at 
the end of Period B depending on his or her purchase level during that period.  The potential long 
term impact of the reward is evidenced in Period C.  This purchase level could be equal to the 
baseline, which would mean no rewarded behavior effect, or anywhere above that rate. 
[Figure 1 Goes About Here]   3 
  The situation is similar to that depicted by Dekimpe and Hanssens (1999) in terms of 
―business as usual‖ and ―hysteresis‖ (p. 399).  If there is no rewarded behavior effect, we have 
business as usual, as purchase rates return to normal after the promotion.  A rewarded behavior 
effect suggests possible hysteresis.  Dekimpe and Hanssens portray hysteresis as a permanent 
change in behavior.  While we cannot guarantee the effect is permanent, the main point is that 
the rewarded behavior effect operates for some time after the consumer receives a reward (in our 
case, we measure the effect for four weeks). 
  The simple effects portrayed in Figure 1 are idealizations.  There is no guarantee they 
operate linearly.  Indeed, the dynamic rational models discussed in the next section include non-
linear discounting of future utility.  For this reason, we do not analyze the data on a week-to-
week basis, but in terms of average purchase rates measured in periods A, B, and C. 
 
The Points Pressure Effect 
  A points pressure effect could be produced by a combination of customer switching costs 
and future orientation.  The customer does not want to patronize a different retailer and lose the 
opportunity to build his or her points total.  This produces a switching cost in the form of a 
foregone opportunity to build up sales levels (points) toward earning the reward.  In order for the 
customer to care about this opportunity cost, he or she must be future oriented, i.e., care about 
the future reward to be gained by accumulating points.  In this way, switching costs and future 
orientation impel the customer to increase spending during Period B in Figure 1. 
  These factors have been formalized in dynamic rational models, where reward programs 
―try to change the customer’s choice process from operating in a spot market to operating in a 
multi-period, contractual relationship market‖ (Dowling and Uncles 1997 pp. 78-79).  Kim, Shi,   4 
and Srinivasan (2001), Lewis (2004), and Kopalle and Neslin (2003) have formulated dynamic 
structural models of reward programs.  In these models the customer makes a purchase decision 
in period t to maximize his or her utility in period t, plus the utility to be expected in future 
periods due to this decision.  The customer realizes that future utility is enhanced by the reward, 
and that he or she needs to accumulate the required sales levels or ―points‖ to earn it.  This 
creates the points pressure: to increase purchases until the reward is earned. 
  Drèze and Hoch (1998) examined a category destination program that awarded a gift 
certificate after a required number of purchases.  They found that category sales of baby-related 
products increased during the program.  Lewis (2004) estimated a dynamic structural model for 
an online retailer who awarded frequent flyer miles to customers who achieved various purchase 
thresholds.  Lewis found that this program increased purchase rates as customers built up their 
sales totals in anticipation of the reward.  Interestingly, he found evidence for market 
segmentation, in that some customers had the future orientation to drive the points pressure 
effect, while others did not.  In a working paper, Bell and Lal (2002) investigated a series of 
frequency reward programs in a retail supermarket.  They found that sales during the reward 
program period (Period B in Figure 2) increased.  Interestingly, infrequent users at the store 
generated the profits while the program had little impact on frequent users.   
 
The Rewarded Behavior Effect 
  The rewarded behavior effect can be produced either by behaviorist or cognitivist 
processes.  Behavioral learning posits that rewarded behavior is more likely to persist (see 
Blattberg and Neslin 1990, Chapter 2, and Rothschild and Gaidis 1981 for discussion of the 
theory in a promotions context).  To the extent that store patronage is rewarded (i.e., by a reward   5 
program), re-patronage is likely to persist.  The time sequence of behavioral learning fits reward 
programs quite well.  The organism must first perform the behavior, then receive the reward, and 
then repeat the behavior. Behavioral learning assumes no inner mental processing by the 
organism. Behavioral learning is not due to active reasoning (e.g., ―It was nice to receive this 
reward; therefore, I’ll use this product again.‖).  Instead, the organism becomes conditioned to 
repeat the behavior simply because of the coupling of the action with the reward. 
From a cognitivist perspective, a reward can increase subsequent purchase behavior if the 
rewarded customer develops positive feelings toward the store that translate into higher 
patronage.  In terms of the classic attitudinal framework (Engel, Blackwell and Minard 1995, p. 
365), rewards produce affect, which increases purchase intentions, which translate into behavior.   
The ability of rewards or gifts to generate affect has been demonstrated in the social psychology 
literature (e.g., Ashby, Isen, and Turken 1999; Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen and Patrick 1983; 
Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp 1978).  There are two paths by which this could translate into 
higher subsequent patronage.  First, Tietje (2002) found that a reward provided by a product-
related source could make positive information regarding that product more accessible in 
memory.  This suggests that the rewarded customer would find it easier to remember positive 
aspects of the shopping experience (see also Kahn and Isen 1993; Isen et. al 1978; Teasdale and 
Fogarty 1979).  Second, positive feelings toward a service experience can lead to higher 
satisfaction and in turn, higher purchase intentions.  These steps have been demonstrated by 
Price, Arnould, and Tierney (1995, Affect => Satisfaction) and Oliver, Rust, and Varki (1997, 
Affect => Satisfaction => Intention).      
Little is known empirically about the effects of reward programs on subsequent consumer 
behavior.  Bell and Lal (2002), in exploring for stockpiling behavior, found evidence for a sales   6 
increase during the redemption period, suggesting a rewarded behavior effect.  Bolton, Kannan, 
and Bramlett (2000) used a customer survey to investigate the reward program of a European 
credit card company.  The reward program enabled the customers to accumulate points by using 
the card and these points could be redeemed for free gifts.  Bolton et al. found that membership 
in this program was associated with greater customer patience with respect to negative service 
encounters (possibly because of the positive affect induced by the gifts they received).  However, 
they did not find a direct link to re-patronage levels. 
 
Individual Differences 
  In view of potential differences operating at the individual level, we believe it is 
important to explore potential individual differences in response to the reward program.  This is 
supported by Lewis (2004), who suggests the existence of consumer segments that vary in their 
response to reward programs, and by Bell and Lal (2002), who found reward programs to be 
more effective among infrequent users.  We will examine individual differences in the magnitude 
of the points pressure effect, and individual differences in which customers self-select into 
receiving a reward.   
It is difficult to hypothesize a priori which individual factors will be important, and what 
the direction of their impact may be.  For example, higher income customers might care less 
about switching costs and hence might have less of a points pressure effect.  On the other hand, 
high income customers may be more future oriented because they are used to making long-term 
investments.  This would make them more subject to points pressure.  We therefore do not 
advance specific hypotheses and view our investigation of individual differences to be 
exploratory.  We consider the following customer characteristics:   7 
• Price consciousness  • Planning orientation  • Shopping enjoyment 
• Information seeking behavior  • Store loyalty  • Income 
• Importance of card savings/reward programs 
 
Contribution of the Paper 
  The above discussion shows that researchers are beginning to find evidence for a points 
pressure impact of reward programs and some indication of a rewarded behavior effect.  The 
goal of our paper is to conduct an integral analysis to measure these effects simultaneously and 
explore the role of several customer characteristics in response to reward programs.   
 
METHOD 
Study Environment 
The study was conducted in a midsize U.S. city.  Eight small to medium chains 
dominated the environment.  The test site was one of the larger chains in the area (containing 
over 25 stores
1).  This chain offered a card program to their customers entitling them to 
additional saving in the store as well as the opportunity to participate in other store promotions.  
The chain gathered all transaction data via individually coded identification cards.  All ID cards 
within a household were linked to provide combined household purchase information. 
 
Description of the Reward Program Promotion 
The test chain offered a promotion to participants in their card program in which 
consumers were given the opportunity to obtain a free turkey or turkey product based upon 
purchases during an eight-week promotion period.  The size of the turkey varied based upon   8 
reaching differing purchase levels.  The promotion period ran from the beginning of September 
to the end of October.  The promotion was conducted annually and data were gathered for two 
different years in which the promotion was offered. 
 
Data Collection 
We collected two types of data, behavioral and self-report.  The first phase of the study 
involved the administration of a mail survey that determined consumers’ general feelings about 
grocery shopping and the amount of shopping conducted in the test chain as well as at other 
stores in the area.  Demographic data were also gathered.  The survey was mailed to a random 
sample of 5500 households who shopped at the test chain.  A cover letter to the survey asked that 
the individual who was responsible for the majority of the grocery shopping in the household 
complete the survey.  Surveys were numbered and coded so that each returned survey could be 
matched with the address to which it was sent
2.  One thousand seventy seven surveys (20% 
response rate) were returned of which 1050 were useable. 
The second phase of data collection required determining actual customer purchase 
behavior.  Basket item data for one hundred and three weeks following survey administration 
were gathered for the households who completed the survey.  These data included a description 
of all items in the grocery basket, the corresponding UPC codes, date, time, and store where the 
transactions took place.   
Using household address, the survey responses were merged with the purchase behavior 
data for survey responders.  In order to be included in the final sample, subjects were required to 
have made at least one purchase during the post promotion period following the second turkey 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Chain/store specifics are intentionally withheld to ensure confidentiality.   9 
promotion.  This ensured the elimination of any households who may have left the study during 
the two years that the purchase data were being gathered.  The final sample contained survey 
responses and purchases for 776 households.  
 
Measurement 
Six-item scales were used to measure both shopping enjoyment and price consciousness 
(see Appendix 1).  We used summations of these measures.  An alternative would be to use 
factor scores.  However, one advantage of summated measures is that they are easy to replicate 
(Hair et al., 1995, pp. 390-391; see also Lehmann et al., 1998, p. 613).
3  In order to determine the 
subject’s propensity to plan and to seek information, subjects were asked to indicate the degree  
to which they agreed with the following statements; ―I generally make a list before going to the 
grocery store,‖ and ―I like to have a great deal of information before I buy.‖ (7-point scale). 
The following eight factors: variety, freshness, location, customer service, deals or 
specials, regular prices, cleanliness, and card savings/reward programs, were listed in the survey.  
Subjects were asked to rank order the five factors they felt were most important when 
considering where to buy their groceries.  We created a ―loyalty card importance‖ variable equal 
to 1 if the respondent specified the card savings/reward programs factor, and 0 if not.
4 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 To ensure privacy protection, the test establishment did not supply the names of individual shoppers.  Surveys 
were addressed to ―Primary Grocery Shopper.‖ 
3 We also conducted a sensitivity analysis by factor analyzing the 12 items.  They factor analyzed cleanly into 
factors interpretable as ―shopping enjoyment‖ and ―price consciousness‖.  The factor scores correlated .97 and .98 
with their summated counterparts.  We also measured the points pressure and rewarded behavior effects (as 
described subsequently) and found the results were very similar whether we used the summated or factor scores. 
4 We had measurement problems with this variable because several respondents simply checked boxes rather than 
rank ordered.  We therefore used the simple 0-1 measure, with a one corresponding to whether the respondent had 
indicated, either through rank order or box check, that loyalty card programs were important.   10 
In order to ascertain the degree of loyalty to the test establishment, subjects were asked to 
indicate whether they did all of their shopping, most of their shopping, half of their shopping, 
occasionally shopped at, rarely shopped at or never shopped at the investigated chain.   
The final self-report measure included in the analysis was income.  Subjects checked one 
of several boxes ranging from ―under $20,000‖ to ―over $150,000‖ to indicate their combined 
annual household income before taxes.   
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 1 displays descriptive statistics.  The two sales figures are for the weeks preceding 
the first and second-year implementations of the reward program (Period A in Figure 1).  They 
show the average sales level for our sample is $39.91 per week in Year 1 and $41.02 in Year 2.  
Average weekly grocery expenses in the U.S. between 1998 and 2002 were $87.40 (Food 
Marketing Institute 2002).   That the average weekly sales of our sample are lower than total 
U.S. weekly expenditures is not surprising.  Note that a ―2‖ on the store loyalty scale signifies ―I 
do most of my shopping‖ at this chain and a ―3‖ signifies ―I do half of my shopping‖ at this 
chain.  Since the average store loyalty is 2.57 (Table 1), average weekly supermarket 
expenditures and average weekly expenditures at our store correspond well to the U.S. average.   
  Among customer characteristics, note from the ―card importance‖ variable that 23% of 
customers evoked the store card savings / reward program as one of five out of nine factors they 
consider when deciding where to shop.  Also, an income of 5.45 corresponds to household 
income between $50k-$59k (Income = 5) and $60k-$75k (Income = 6). 
[Table 1 Goes About Here] 
  The two pre-program sales figures are highly correlated.  Store loyalty is positively   11 
correlated with sales levels, as is income.
5  There is not much correlation between the customer 
characteristics themselves.  Price consciousness is positively correlated with shopping 
enjoyment, information search, and card importance, and negatively correlated with store loyalty 
and income.  Planning is negatively correlated with card importance, and shopping enjoyment is 
negatively correlated with income. 
 
Points Pressure Effect 
  We measure the points pressure effect for each year by comparing the average sales 
levels per customer in the pre-program period (Period A) to the sales levels during the program-
period (Period B).  To do this, we estimate a random effects regression.  We use the random 
effects approach because we are measuring each customer twice and need to account for the fact 
that these are not independent observations.  We also must control for different sales levels 
across households.  We control for observed differences by including main effects for customer 
characteristic variables.  We control for unobserved differences by including the heterogeneous 
random effect for each household.  We also want to determine if shoppers with different 
customer characteristics reacted differently to the program, and include interactions between 
program availability and customer characteristics to answer that question.  The model 
specification is as follows
6: 
ij
'
i ik j
7
1 k
k ik
7
1 k
k j 1 0 ij X * og Pr X og Pr Sales   (1) 
where 
                                                 
5 Recall from Table 1 that store loyalty is coded so that a smaller number means higher loyalty. 
6 Please note there is no adjustment for seasonality because preliminary analysis indicated there was no seasonality.  
Specifically, we obtained data on monthly supermarket sales in the region where our retailer was located.  We then 
calculated monthly seasonals.  We found very little seasonality.  The highest monthly seasonal was 1.00249 (for 
April) and the lowest was .994148 (for June).     12 
  i  =  1, . . ., 776 households. 
  j  =  1, 2 (1 => pre-reward program period; 2 => reward program period). 
  k  =  1, . . ., 7 labeling the 7 customer characteristic variables. 
  Salesij  =  Average weekly sales for household i in period j.
7   
  Progj  =  1 if j = 2 (reward program period); 0 if j = 1 (pre-reward program period). 
  Xik  =  Value of customer characteristic k for household i.  These variables are 
mean-centered. 
  '
i   =  Random effect for household i. 
  ij   =  Random error for household i in period j. 
 
  The  1 parameter represents the ―main‖ points pressure effect and the k ’s represent 
interactions with customer characteristics, i.e., whether the points pressure effect differs by 
customer characteristic.  Since the customer characteristics are mean-centered,  1 represents the 
points pressure effect for the average household, and the k ’s represent departures from this 
average.  The  k  parameters represent controls for average sales levels due to observed 
customer characteristic variables, i.e., higher income households may systematically spend more 
than lower income households.  The  '
i  random effect controls for unobserved differences in 
household sales levels. 
  Equation (1) was estimated using the ―Proc Mixed‖ procedure in SAS.  The variance of 
the household random effect was highly significant (p < .0001) indicating that indeed there were 
differences in normal household spending levels in addition to those captured by the customer 
characteristic variables. 
  Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients for Years 1 and 2.  We show two models: a 
                                                 
7 For j = 2, the reward program period, the average sales level is over 8 weeks, the length of the reward program 
period.  For j = 1, the pre-program period, average sales were over three weeks for the first year (because this 
brought us back to the beginning of the data) and seven weeks for the second year (because we then had a longer 
baseline period available).   13 
―fully specified‖ model that includes all variables, and a ―reduced‖ model that includes only the 
variables that achieved a t-statistic greater than 1 in the fully specified model.
8  In this case, the 
coefficients, as well as their significance levels, are similar between the fully specified and 
reduced models. 
[Table 2 Goes About Here] 
  The first and most important result in Table 2 is a significant points pressure effect of 
$2.44 for year 1 and $2.61 for year 2.  With baseline sales levels of $39.91 per customer in year 
1 and $41.02 in year 2 (see Table 1), this amounts to a 6.1% weekly sales gain for year 1 and a 
6.4% sales gain for year 2.  That is, the reward program increased sales per household during the 
8-week reward program period by an average of 6.1% in year 1 and 6.4% in year 2.   
  The interactions are not strongly significant.  However, quite interesting is the negative 
interaction involving card importance.  Although the result is not highly significant, it appears 
consistently in both years.
9  The negative sign means that households that ascribed high 
importance to reward program savings were subject to a lower points pressure effect.  At first 
this appears counter-intuitive because one would think households who value reward program 
savings would be highly responsive, not unresponsive, to the turkey reward program.  However, 
the result could be due to the short-term manner in which frequent shopper cards are currently 
implemented, that is, to deliver immediate discounts.    Our results suggest that households that 
value the short-term savings provided by frequent shopper cards may not be motivated by future 
oriented promotions such as the turkey reward program. 
  Note that the main effects of many of the customer characteristic variables, representing 
observed heterogeneity in purchase levels, are significant.  Sales are higher for households that 
                                                 
8 For an OLS regression model, adding an independent variable to a model will decrease the standard error of the 
estimate only if it’s t-statistic in the new model is greater than one (Plane and Oppermann 1981, p. 380).   14 
are not price conscious but have higher incomes and are loyal to the supermarket in question.  
Planning is significantly positively associated with sales in Year 2, and marginally significant in 
Year 1 (p=.147).  The main effects for the other psychographic variables are not significantly 
related to sales levels.   These results are consistent with the correlations shown in Table 1. 
 
Rewarded Behavior Effect 
   The rewarded behavior effect proposes that households who redeem rewards will 
generate higher sales post-redemption than they would have had they not redeemed the reward.  
Our strategy to measure this is a ―before-after with one control group‖ analysis (Lehmann et al., 
1998, p. 156).  We first calculate the difference between rewarded customers’ weekly sales rates 
after they received a reward and their baseline sales rates before the turkey promotion.  We then 
calculate the same difference for non-rewarded customers.  Finally we subtract the non-rewarded 
customer difference from the rewarded customer difference as an estimate of the rewarded 
behavior effect.     
  To generate the ―control group‖ sample of non-rewarded customers, we first divided 
rewarded customers into seven groups depending on the week in which they redeemed their 
reward (see Appendix 2 for details).  Next, we selected non-rewarded customers who had 
average baseline sales within $9 of the baseline for at least one of the rewarded customer 
groups.
10  We assigned each non-rewarded customer to the rewarded customer group whose 
baseline was closest to their baseline.  The procedure netted 66 non-rewarded customers in Year 
1 compared to 150 rewarded customers, and 121 non-rewarded customers in Year 2 compared to 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Note also that the weak statistical significance could be due to the measurement problems described in Footnote 4. 
10 The $9 was chosen to reach a reasonable compromise between the desire to find enough non-rewarded customers 
to serve as a control and the desire to make them as close as possible to the rewarded customers in terms of baseline 
sales.   15 
153 rewarded customers.  The average weekly baseline sales levels were $86 (rewarded) versus 
$81 (non-rewarded) for Year 1 and $89 (rewarded) versus $73 (non-rewarded) for Year 2.  The 
non-rewarded customers have lower baseline sales levels than the rewarded customers, but far 
closer than if we had randomly selected non-rewarded customers. 
  We must also control for the fact that customers self-select into rewarded versus non-
rewarded groups.  Selection biases occur whenever individuals decide first whether to participate 
in a program and the analyst is interested in their behavior once they are participating.  If the 
behavioral model leaves out factors that are correlated with the decision to participate, the 
inferences from the behavioral model can be biased.  In our case, customers self-select into 
rewarded versus not rewarded groups.  We wish to examine the impact of this decision on sales 
of both groups.  We use a switching regression analysis to control for potential selectivity bias 
(Maddala 1983, pp. 223-227; 260-264).  The model consists of a Probit model to predict whether 
a customer will be rewarded or not rewarded, and a baseline regression model to predict sales 
relative to the customer’s baseline after this decision.  The analysis is as follows: 
Probit Redemption Model: 
  i
J
1 j
ij j 0
*
i X D   (2) 
  Customer i rewarded if  0 D*
i  
  Customer i not rewarded if  0 D*
i  
 
  Where: 
*
i D   =  Household i’s unobserved latent utility for being rewarded. 
ij X   =  Value of customer characteristic variable j for customer i.  Each variable 
was mean-centered. 
i  =  error term for customer i in modeling latent utility for being rewarded.   16 
j 0,   =  Probit parameters to be estimated. 
We can then define: 
 
Di  =  1 if customer i is observed to be rewarded (i.e., if  0 D*
i ) 
  =  0 if customer i is observed to be not rewarded (i.e., if  0 D*
i ) 
This means that the probability customer i is rewarded is P(Di = 1) = P( 0 D*
i ). 
 
Baseline Regression Model: 
  i 1 i 1 0 1 ip Baseline Sales   (if customer i rewarded)  (3a) 
  i 2 i
'
1
'
0 0 ip Baseline Sales   (if customer i is not rewarded)  (3b) 
  Where: 
Salesip1  =  Sales per week for rewarded customer i in the 4 weeks after redeeming the 
customer’s reward for a free turkey.   
 
Salesip0  =  Sales per week for non-rewarded customer i in the 4 weeks after the 
rewarded customers with whom this customer is matched redeemed their 
reward. 
 
Baselinei  =  Average weekly sales level for customer i during the period before the 
reward program (Period A in Figure 1). 
 
'
1
'
0 1 0 , , ,  Parameters to be estimated 
 
i 2 i 1 ,   =  Error terms influencing sales levels of rewarded and non-rewarded 
customers. 
 
We assume the error terms follow a multivariate normal distribution as follows: 
 
2
2 12 2
12
2
1 1
2 1
i 2 i 1 i
1
matrix ariance cov with MVN , ,  
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood (Greene 1998).  After estimation, post-
redemption sales can be predicted using the following equations:   17 
  ) / ( ˆ ˆ Baseline ˆ ˆ es l ˆ Sa 1 1 i 1 0 1 ip   (rewarded customers)  (4a) 
  )) 1 /( ( ˆ ˆ Baseline ˆ ˆ es l ˆ Sa 2 2 i
'
1
'
0 0 ip  (non-rewarded customers)  (4b) 
where the hats signify estimated coefficients, and  
  =  The standard normal distribution evaluated at  *
i D ˆ  ( *
i D ˆ calculated from the 
estimated Probit equation). 
  =  The cumulative standard normal distribution evaluated at  *
i D ˆ  ( *
i D ˆ  is 
calculated from the estimated Probit equation). 
 
  Note that there are three relevant sales levels in this analysis (see Figure 1).  Baseline is 
the customer sales level before the reward program begins.  We use this as the ―before‖ in the 
before-after analysis.  Sales during the reward program (Salesij in equation (1)) are used to 
determine if the customer is eligible for a reward.  Sales after the reward is the variable we study 
to determine the rewarded behavior effect (Salesip1 for rewarded customers and Salesip0 for our 
matched sample of non-rewarded customers).  Note also that all customers with frequent shopper 
cards were automatically enrolled in the program.  In order to obtain a reward, the customer 
needed to decide whether to obtain a frequent shopper card, whether to spend enough to earn a 
free turkey, and given that he or she earned the turkey, whether to ―cash in‖ and receive the 
turkey.  Our analysis summarizes the impact of progressing through all of these decisions, up to 
and including receiving the turkey, on subsequent sales levels.      
  Table 3 displays the estimation results.  We first examine the Probit model, which reveals 
the type of customer attracted by the reward.  In Year 1, the reward attracts price conscious but 
not store-loyal customers.  In Year 2, the reward attracted a less well-defined group.  The only 
variable marginally significant in the Year 2 Probit is ―Search,‖ indicating that the reward 
attracted customers who like to accumulate a lot of information before making a decision.  One   18 
interpretation of these results is that in Year 1, the reward served as a cue and attracted price 
conscious but low need-for-cognition customers (Inman, McAlister, and Hoyer 1990; note the 
Search variable is negatively signed), whereas in the second year, it only attracted customers 
who were convinced it was a good ―deal‖ (the ―high NFC’s‖ in Inman et al.’s characterization). 
  Our estimate of the rewarded behavior effect was calculated using the bootstrap method 
(Efron 1979).  There were two reasons for bootstrapping:  First, it provides standard errors for 
the switching regression predictions, where the usual OLS standard error of the estimate cannot 
be applied.  Second, it is not appropriate to substitute mean values into the calculation, because 
the switching regressions are nonlinear due to the selectivity bias terms, and the mean of a 
nonlinear function does not equal that function evaluated at its means.   
  Our point estimate of the rewarded behavior effect is the average of 
i 1 ip Baseline es l ˆ Sa for rewarded customers minus the average of  i 0 ip Baseline es l ˆ Sa for non-
rewarded customers.  We calculate this quantity for 1000 random draws of the baseline 
regression and probit parameters, drawn from the estimated distribution of these parameters 
provided by the MLE estimation.  This provided bootstrapped estimates of the mean change and 
its standard error.  The results were as follows: 
 
  The results show that rewarded customers exhibited an average increase in weekly sales 
over their baseline of $16.07 in Year 1 and $10.41 in Year 2.  The change in sales levels for non-
rewarded customers was not significantly different from zero in both years.  These results have 
  Rewarded Customers  Non-Rewarded Customers  Net Incremental Impact 
  Mean 
Change 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Change 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Error 
Year 1  $16.07  $3.98  $-0.88  $9.58  $16.95  $10.49 
Year 2  $10.41  $3.20  $-0.94  $3.25  $11.36  $4.76   19 
high face validity—the rewarded customers experienced an increase in sales and the non-
rewarded customers did not.  The net incremental rewarded behavior impact is $16.95 for Year 1 
and $11.36 for Year 2.  The Year 1 impact is significant at the p=.106 level (t=1.618); the Year 2 
impact is significant at the p=.017 level (t=2.387). 
  For additional diagnostics, we plotted predicted post-redemption sales rates for the 
rewarded customers versus their baseline sales rates.  We did this for the average customer for 
illustration and the results are shown in Figure 2.  The key parameters that drive this plot are the 
slopes and intercepts of the switching regressions in Table 3.  Judging from the lift versus 
baseline, the results suggest that the reward increased sales among customers with lower 
baselines more than those with higher baselines.  This makes sense in that the customers with 
lower baselines would presumably have more room to grow their sales rates.  Bell and Lal 
(2002) find a similar result.    
[Figure 2 Goes About Here] 
  The average impact of the reward program is approximately $14 per week (($16.95 + 
$11.36)/2).  Since the average baseline sales across groups is approximately $80 per week, this 
represents a 17.5% increase in sales rates relative to baseline levels.  This may at first seem large.  
However, only approximately 20% of our sample redeemed a reward each year (150 in Year 1 
and 153 in Year 2, out of 776 customers).  A 17.5% increase in sales among 20% of customers 
amounts to a 3.5% increase overall.  In addition, the effect is for four-week periods staggered 
over a 7-week time horizon corresponding to the seven time periods during which the 
redemptions took place.  Therefore in any week we would see on average a little more than half 
of the 3.5% increase, or about 1.8%.  So overall, we find a 6% increase in weekly store sales   20 
over an 8-week period due to points pressure, and a 1.8% increase over a 7-week period due to 
rewarded behavior.  These results have face validity.
11 
 
Robustness Checks 
  We conducted several analyses to investigate the robustness of the rewarded behavior 
findings.  These are as follows. 
  Figure 3 illustrates the findings graphically.  This shows average weekly sales for 
rewarded versus non-rewarded customers in the pre-program, during program, and post-
redemption periods.  The figure shows that although rewarded and non-rewarded customers start 
out roughly matched on sales levels (as noted earlier), rewarded customers purchase more during 
the program-period (due to points pressure), and then maintain that difference in the post-
redemption period.  If there were no rewarded behavior effect, the difference in sales between 
the two groups would have returned to the pre-program period level.  Instead, the difference was 
maintained.  The rewarded customers maintained their high purchase rate although there was no 
longer any points-pressure motivation to do so.  This is consistent with a rewarded behavior 
effect. 
[Figure 3 Goes About Here] 
  We next investigated whether the independent variables included in the Probit equation 
affected the results.  The motivation to do this was that several of the independent variables in 
that equation were not statistically significant (Table 3).  We therefore undertook a two-stage 
process where in the first stage we estimated a Probit model that included all the psychographic 
variables plus the Baseline variable.  We re-estimated the switching model using for the Probit 
                                                 
11 Our results are similar in magnitude to Bell and Lal (2002).  These researchers find a post-reward effect equal to a 
9% gain among ―best‖ customers, 11% among ―better‖ customers, and 17% among ―other‖ customers.   21 
only those variables that were statistically significant, and then calculated new mean changes and 
net incremental impact.  The results were all within one standard error of our original results. 
  Lastly, we investigated various other methodological approaches for computing the 
rewarded behavior effect.  We used the following techniques: 
  Covariate Adjustment (CA):  We adjusted the  /  and  ) 1 /( factors in 
equations 4a and 4b relative to the population average.  The motivation was to adjust 
these predictions if customers were exceptionally different on these factors relative to the 
sample as a whole. 
  Two-stage least squares (2SLS):  This estimates 
i i 2 i 1 0 ip D Baseline Sales  using two-stage least squares (Greene 1998, p. 
717).  The endogenous variable is Di.  The instruments are the psychographic variables. 
  OLS:  We estimated  i i 2 i 1 0 ip D Baseline Sales  using ordinary least 
squares. 
  Average Treatment Effect (ATE):  This measure is used in the economic evaluation of 
social programs (see Winship and Morgan 1999; Heckman et al. 2003).   
  Treatment Effect on the Treated (TT):  This measure is also used in the economic 
evaluation of social programs (Winship and Morgan 1999; Heckman et al. 2003). 
  Expected difference between rewarded and non-rewarded customers (EC):  This measure 
is described in the Stata reference manual (2003, p. 280). 
 
  CA, OLS, ATE, and EC produced results that were relatively close to those obtained with 
our analysis, although a bit higher.  These results ranged from $17.77 to $24.81 for Year 1 (vs. 
$16.95 for our analysis) and from $12.03 to $27.49 for Year 2 (vs. $11.36 for our analysis).  
2SLS produced poor results (-$22.05 for Year 1 and $40.45 for Year 2) although with very high 
standard errors ($31.14 and $27.49).  2SLS is known to produce higher standard errors so this 
result was not very surprising (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981, p. 339).  TT produced much larger 
estimates ($53.31 for Year 1 and $98.82 for Year 2).  These estimates lack face validity.  For 
example, it seems implausible that the reward could have increased purchasing by $98.82 per 
week when base sales are approximately $80 per week and post-reward sales averaged 
approximately $90 per week!  The standard error for Year 1 was $40.01, so that estimate is not   22 
significantly different than ours.  However, the standard error for Year 2 was $11.75, so the 
$98.82 is statistically higher than our estimate.  It is difficult to diagnose the exact reason for this 
discrepancy.  We note that TT assumes one can predict the sales rate for a rewarded customer 
had that individual customer not received that reward by adjusting the error term in equation 3b. 
  Overall, all the robustness tests support the existence of a positive rewarded behavior 
effect.  Out of six methods investigated, four produced very similar results to our method, one 
(2SLS) produced different results that could be easily explained, and one method (TT) produced 
different results that had little face validity. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Summary 
  We have examined the impact of a turkey reward program offered in two successive 
years for a supermarket using actual field data.  The results for both years show a current period 
―points pressure‖ impact and a post-program ―rewarded behavior‖ effect.  Store-wide, weekly 
sales increased on average by 6.1% in year 1 and 6.4% in year 2 during the 8 week program- 
period, as shoppers increased their purchase levels in order to receive a reward.  This points 
pressure effect was particularly strong among shoppers who ordinarily do not consider frequent 
shopper programs to be an important benefit.   
We also found that the shoppers who were rewarded with a free turkey experienced a 
rewarded behavior effect. That is, the redeemers’ purchase rate did not immediately return to 
pre-program levels after they redeemed the free turkey.  The magnitude of the effect is an 
increase in store sales of 1.8% per week over a 7-week period. 
It is interesting that the points-pressure effect is larger in aggregate than the rewarded   23 
behavior effect.  This is consistent with work in the sales promotion field that finds repeat 
purchase effects to be smaller than current period effects (Keane 1997; Gedenk and Neslin 
1999).  However, the rewarded behavior effect is isolated to a minority of customers who redeem 
a reward, and can be quite substantial among these customers. 
One question is the extent to which these findings generalize to other venues.  While a 
free-turkey reward program seems specialized, it is not dissimilar in form than the ―Buy x-times, 
get a free xx‖ structure of many reward programs common in the supermarket industry, the retail 
industry, and in other consumer products industries.  However, further research is needed to 
examine how our results differ according to the values of ―x‖ and ―xx.‖ 
 
Managerial Implications 
  The first implication of our findings is that reward programs can contribute to profit.  Just 
taking into account points pressure, an increase of 6% per customer translates to $2.40 per 
customer per week (on a base of $40, see Table 1) over the 8 weeks of the program, or $19.20 
per customer.  Using a gross margin of 28.4%, this implies a contribution of $5.45 per customer.  
The cost of the program per customer is as follows.  Among the 776 customers in our database, 
150 received a free turkey.  Assume the cost of the turkey was approximately $5.  The cost of the 
turkey per customer was therefore ($5x150)/776, or $0.97 per customer.  Administrative costs 
include keeping track of each customer’s purchase levels and notifying winners.  The tracking 
costs were minimal since they were done through the chain’s existing computer system.  
Notification costs would be the costs of printing and sending notices.  This would be 
approximately $0.30 per winner, or ($0.30x150)/776 = $0.06 per customer.  Total costs of the 
turkey promotion are therefore $0.97 + $0.06 = $1.03 per customer.  From that investment, the   24 
company gains $5.45 profit contribution.  That is an ROI of ($5.45-$1.03)/$1.03 ≈ 400%.  One 
could make the calculation more precise by including the rewarded behavior effect and more 
detail on administrative costs, but the calculation illustrates that the reward program can generate 
substantial profits.  This corresponds nicely with Bell and Lal (2002) who also find a turkey 
reward program profitable based on its points pressure contribution. 
  A second implication of our findings is the difference between short-term discounts 
delivered via frequent shopper cards, and the long-term reward delivered through a buy-x-
receive-xx reward program.  Both are loyalty programs in the sense that both intend to increase 
store loyalty.  The reward program we studied is linked more explicitly to store loyalty.  
However, a fascinating future study would be to compare the impact (both short term and long 
term) of a buy-x-receive-xx reward program to the short-term discounts offered to all shoppers 
who possess a frequent shopper card. 
  A third implication is that our results suggest that the frequency reward program is a 
targeted promotion.  For example, we found it to be effective among those who place less value 
on the store’s current frequent shopper program.  Segmentation is the hallmark of many 
successful promotions (Farris and Quelch 1987).  Our results suggest that a frequency reward 
program could target one set of shoppers while the everyday frequent shopper program 
(immediately-available discounts) could target a different set, suggesting there is room for both 
types of activities in the store’s promotion mix. 
  A final implication is that frequency reward programs need to be evaluated both in the 
short and long term.  The points pressure effect could by itself make the reward program 
profitable.  However, the rewarded behavior effect can be significant, albeit by definition only 
among those who receive the reward.     25 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
  This paper measures the short-term (points pressure) and long-term (rewarded behavior) 
impact of a loyalty reward program.    While we theorized the behavioral mechanisms that might 
produce these effects, we have not investigated which particular process is at work.  For 
example, we have not shown whether the rewarded behavior effect is the product of behavioral 
learning or of cognitive changes in customer affect or intentions.  The importance of the 
measured effects we find suggest it would be worthy for laboratory experiments to tease out the 
exact mechanism.   
  Related to the question of which mechanisms govern our results is the role of perceived 
effort.  Kivetz and Simonson (2003) provide evidence that customers are more likely to join 
loyalty programs when they perceive the effort required of them is low compared to others.  The 
authors refer to this as ―idiosyncratic fit.‖  An interesting area for future research would be to 
investigate how idiosyncratic fit relates to the rewarded behavior effect.  Based on Dodson, 
Tybout, and Sternthal (1978), one might conjecture that higher idiosyncratic fit would correlate 
with a lower rewarded behavior effect, since these authors find lower effort in buying on 
promotion is associated with lower repeat rates.  This is somewhat supported by our result that 
the rewarded behavior effect was weakest for customers with high baselines, who presumably 
would have higher idiosyncratic fit (Figure 2).  In any case, this merits further investigation. 
  A second limitation is that while our robustness checks for the rewarded behavior effect 
generally converged well with our results, the convergence was not perfect.  One method 
(treatment effect on the treated) produced very different results that in fact lacked face validity.  
This illustrates the challenge in estimating the effectiveness of programs with non-random   26 
assignment.  Future research is needed both to replicate our results and investigate various ways 
for accounting for selectivity bias in calculating the rewarded behavior effect. 
  In addition to comparing immediately-delivered frequent shopper price discounts to 
reward programs, and measuring the impact of different program design parameters, another area 
would be competitive effects (Kopalle and Neslin 2003).  What happens if all stores adopt turkey 
reward programs?  Will consumers become inured to the same reward program implemented 
each year?  We did not uncover evidence of that, since the measured impact is roughly the same 
each year, but that could change if more stores adopt similar programs (see Thompson and 
Noordeweir (1992) for a study of repeated rebate programs in the automobile industry).   
  Our analysis is a cross-sectional/time series econometric approach.  Another line of 
future research would be to demonstrate the points pressure and rewarded behavior effects using 
a different research design, such as a consumer survey or a field experiment.  The reason is that 
with our approach, one can never be positive about causation and the role of omitted factors such 
as competitive activity. 
  The findings in this paper suggest that factors such as attitudes toward reward programs, 
store loyalty, price consciousness, and the desire to accumulate information before buying, play a 
role in both points pressure and rewarded behavior responses.  Further research is needed to 
develop a broad consumer behavior theory that would explain these roles, and more research is 
needed to replicate and extend our empirical results on individual differences. 
  Another avenue for future research would be to explore the dynamics of points pressure 
and rewarded behavior effects in more detail.  This would involve a weekly or purchase-by-
purchase analysis at the individual level.  Dynamic rational models would be useful here (Lewis 
2004).  Another approach would be to employ structural break modeling (Grewal et al. 2001) to   27 
determine exactly when customer buying behavior changes due to reward programs.  This would 
be highly useful because it would verify the extent to which the linear effects idealized in Figure 
1 apply to the real world, and would have implications for optimal reward levels and time 
requirements. 
  In summary, there is much more to be learned about the impact of reward programs.  
However, we are encouraged by the results in this study demonstrating both a short and long-
term impact captured by points pressure and rewarded behavior effects.   28 
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APPENDIX 1 
Multi-Item Measures 
 
All items were measured on a 7-point scale. 
(strongly disagree–strongly agree) 
 
Shopping Enjoyment (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.86) 
I enjoy grocery shopping. 
Grocery shopping takes too much time. (R) 
I wish I could get someone else to do my grocery shopping. (R) 
I look forward to my trips to the grocery store. 
I do not mind spending a lot of time shopping for groceries. 
Grocery shopping is a necessary evil. (R) 
 
Price Consciousness (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.79) 
I shop a lot for ―specials.‖ 
Most of the time, I check the prices of items I buy at the grocery store. 
I usually watch the advertisements for announcements of sales. 
I believe a person can save a lot of money by shopping around for bargains. 
I usually look at in-store sale circulars when I’m shopping. 
I often plan what I’m going to buy based upon what is on sale. 
   32 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Description of Matched Sample 
 
  Rewarded Customers  Non-Rewarded Customers 
 
Year 
 
Group 
Average 
Baseline 
Sample 
Size 
 
Group 
Average 
Baseline 
Sample 
Size 
1  1  $82.69  37  1  $80.53  10 
1  2  $92.43  40  2  $93.67  2 
1  3  $98.32  6  3  $99.97  14 
1  4  $88.39  9  4  $87.74  3 
1  5  $73.76  15  5  $70.40  30 
1  6  $84.98  31  6  $85.12  3 
1  7  $89.07  12  7  $89.91  4 
1  Total  $86.36  150  Total  $81.55  66 
 
2  1  $91.10  41  1  $91.59  10 
2  2  $83.11  47  2  $80.35  23 
2  3  $133.30  3  3  $136.56  4 
2  4  $58.85  4  4  $55.82  37 
2  5  $66.46  18  5  $67.29  38 
2  6  $108.52  27  6  $112.15  6 
2  7  $100.82  13  7  $97.70  3 
2  Total  $89.63  153  Total  $73.54  121 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Interpretation 
Sales_Pre1  $39.91  $39.30  Avg weekly sales prior to program initiation 
Year1 
Sales_Pre2  $41.02  $39.19  Avg weekly sales prior to program initiation 
Year2 
Price Consciousness  4.74  1.24  1-7 scale.  7=> more price conscious 
Planning  5.50  1.70  1-7 scale.  7=> more apt to plan shopping 
Shopping 
Enjoyment 
4.00  1.35  1-7 scale.  7=> enjoy shopping 
Information Seeking  3.90  1.50  1-7 scale.  7=> seek more information 
Store Loyal  2.57  1.36  1-6 scale.  1=> more store loyal 
Card Importance  0.23  0.42  0-1 scale.  1=> card savings important 
Income  5.45  2.18  1-9 scale.  9=> higher income 
 
 
Correlations 
 
  Sales 
Pre1 
Sales 
Pre2 
Price 
Cons 
 
Planning 
Enjoy 
Shop 
Info. 
Seeking 
Store 
Loyal 
Card 
Imp 
 
Income 
Sales 
Pre1 
1                 
Sales 
Pre2 
0.75  1               
Price 
Cons 
-0.13  -0.16  1             
Planning 
 
0.03  0.06  0.09  1           
Enjoy 
Shop 
-0.03  -0.03  0.19  0.16  1         
Info. 
Seeking 
0.01  -0.01  0.36  0.11  0.00  1       
Store 
Loyal 
-0.40  -0.38  0.11  0.03  -0.02  0.00  1     
Card 
Imp 
0.06  0.02  0.11  -0.13  0.07  0.09  -0.12  1   
Income 
 
0.28  0.29  -0.15  -0.04  -0.14  -0.06  -0.09  -0.04  1 
 
Note:  n = 776.  Given the same size, correlations greater than .07 in absolute value are 
statistically significant at p<.05.   34 
Table 2 
 
Points Pressure Random Effects Regression Results 
 
 
Year 1         
  Full Model  Reduced Model 
  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Intercept  39.208  0.000  39.245  0.000 
Prog  2.439  0.012  2.346  0.015 
Price Cons  -0.413  0.022  -0.390  0.021 
Planning  1.243  0.107  1.075  0.147 
Shop Enjoy  0.018  0.908       
Info. Seeking  1.118  0.178  1.246  0.134 
Store Loyal  -10.699  0.000  -10.744  0.000 
Card Imp.  3.646  0.219  3.480  0.239 
Income  4.197  0.000  4.196  0.000 
Prog*Price Cons  0.027  0.823       
Prog*Planning  -0.341  0.444       
Prog*Shop Enjoy  0.051  0.618       
Prog*Info. Seeking  0.295  0.593       
Prog*Store Loyal  -0.068  0.905       
Prog*Card Imp.  -3.407  0.077  -2.994  0.113 
Prog*Income  0.459  0.244  0.422  0.302 
 
 
Year 2         
  Full Model  Reduced Model 
  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Intercept  40.832  0.000  40.800  0.000 
Prog  2.611  0.001  2.634  0.001 
Price Cons  -0.597  0.002  -0.609  0.001 
Planning  2.054  0.007  1.995  0.009 
Shop Enjoy  0.087  0.578       
Info. Seeking  0.929  0.284  0.956  0.279 
Store Loyal  -9.899  0.000  -9.796  0.000 
Card Imp.  1.264  0.699  1.400  0.671 
Income  4.444  0.000  4.397  0.000 
Prog*Price Cons  -0.072  0.423       
Prog*Planning  -0.129  0.745       
Prog*Shop Enjoy  0.026  0.766       
Prog*Info. Seeking  -0.618  0.178  -0.760  0.092 
Prog*Store Loyal  0.258  0.574       
Prog*Card Imp.  -2.067  0.163  -2.151  0.136 
Prog*Income  0.388  0.205  0.393  0.207 
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Table 3 
 
Switching Regression Analysis of Rewarded Behavior Effect 
    Year 1  Year 2 
               
    Coef.  t-Stat  p-value  Coef.  t-Stat  p-value 
Probit  Constant  -0.060  0.11  0.91  -0.263  0.69  0.49 
Pricecon  0.028  2.01  0.05  -0.003  0.28  0.78 
Plang  -0.049  1.10  0.27  0.005  0.14  0.89 
Shopenj  -0.001  0.05  0.96  0.014  1.25  0.21 
Search  -0.064  1.06  0.29  0.065  1.61  0.11 
Storeloy  0.109  2.37  0.02  -0.017  0.62  0.54 
Cardimp  -0.233  1.27  0.20  0.045  0.32  0.75 
Income  -0.022  0.49  0.62  0.035  1.27  0.21 
               
Rewarded 
Customer 
Regression 
Constant  23.720  2.65  0.01  18.397  2.27  0.02 
Baseline  0.630  8.18  0.00  0.499  7.44  0.00 
  0.899  13.60  0.00  0.940  29.99  0.00 
  53.217  12.78  0.00  56.537  12.29  0.00 
               
Non-
Rewarded 
Customer 
Regression 
Constant  -34.0373  0.86  0.39  -3.066  0.28  0.78 
Baseline  1.095  3.09  0.00  0.421  3.18  0.00 
  -0.492  0.85  0.40  -0.931  22.03  0.00 
  36.159  3.79  0.00  53.36  11.14  0.00 
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Figure 1 
 
Points Pressure and Rewarded Behavior Effects 
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Figure 2 
 
Differential Rewarded Behavior Effect Depending on Customer Baseline Sales 
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Figure 3 
 
Aggregate Sales Levels Pre, During, and Post-Reward Program:   
Rewarded vs. Non-Rewarded Customers 
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Notes:  n = 216 shoppers for Year 1; n = 274 for Year 2 
 
 
 